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AN EU RECOVERY PROGRAMME FOR UKRAINE? 
TOWARDS A NEW NARRATIVE 
FOR EU—UKRAINE RELATIONS?
Alister Miskimmon5
(Queen’s University, Belfast, United Kingdom)
Ben O’Loughlin
(Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, United Kingdom)
Alister Miskimmon and Ben O’Loughlin. An EU recovery programme for Ukraine? Towards a 
new narrative for EU—Ukraine relations? In 1947, the United States of America launched the European 
Recovery Programme to support the post-war reconstruction of Europe. The Marshall Plan, as it became 
known after U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, was one of the major success stories of US foreign 
policy in the twentieth century. The notion of an EU Recovery Programme for Ukraine provoked interest –
and division in Ukraine. The enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 demonstrated the EU’s capacity to 
mount grand economic and political projects. However, since then, the EU has faced difficulties exerting 
influence and constructing a coherent narrative of its role in the European neighbourhood and the wider 
world. Would a more transformative aid and development programme for its Ukrainian neighbour offer an 
opportunity for the EU as well as Ukraine? In this article we use a series of elite interviews conducted across 
Ukraine in 2016-17 to explore how such a notion is understood. We find that Ukrainian elites have mixed 
feelings about existing EU aid programmes; many respondents resented the conditions the EU imposes, but 
nor do they want or expect aid to be given unconditionally. Whilst many aspire for Ukraine to reach EU 
standards of law and prosperity, Ukrainian elites favour self-help in their efforts to forge a stable sovereign 
state. Both the EU and Russia are understood as metonymies – as standing for two sets of values and 
geopolitical futures – and neither quite fit what Ukrainians seek. We conclude that whilst a Marshall Plan-
style action could have benefits, it is not desired as a basis for a shared narrative and basis of cooperation and 
development.
Key words: EU—Ukraine relations, Marshall Plan, economy, politics, narrative, Ukrainian elites, 
interviews. 
Алістер Міскімон, Бен О'Луглін. Програма ЄС, спрямована на оздоровлення України? У 
напрямку до нового наративу у відносинах між ЄС та Україною? У 1947 році Сполучені Штати 
Америки започаткували Програму європейського оздоровлення задля підтримки відбудови 
післявоєнної Європи. План Маршалла, названий на честь Держсекретаря США Джорджа Маршалла, 
став одним із найвагоміших досягнень в американській зовнішній політиці двадцятого століття. Ідея 
європейської програми, спрямованої на оздоровлення України, викликає як інтерес, так і несумісність 
думок українців. Розширення ЄС у 2004 і 2007 роках продемонструвало здатність ЄС здійснювати 
масштабні економічні та політичні проекти. Однак з тих пір ЄС зазнала труднощів у розповсюдженні 
свого впливу і формулюванні зрозумілого наративу щодо своєї ролі в європейському сусідстві та у 
широкому світі.  Чи зможе конструктивніша допомога та програма розвитку для українського сусіда 
надати нові можливості як для ЄС, так і для України? У цій статті ми аналізуємо серію інтерв'ю, 
взятих у представників еліти з різних регіонів України в 2016-2017 роках з метою отримати відповідь 
на поставлене запитання. Результати аналізу показують, що представники української еліти мають 
змішані почуття щодо існуючих програм допомоги Україні з боку ЄС; багато респондентів обурені 
умовами, висунутими ЄС, проте вони й не очікують на відсутність умов як таких. Численні 
представники української еліти прагнуть досягнення Україною європейських стандартів у 
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законодавстві і добробуті громадян, але водночас надають перевагу самостійній розбудові незалежної 
держави. І Україна, і Росія сприймаються метонімічно – як носії двох систем цінностей та 
геополітичних прагнень; і жодна з цих систем не задовольняє вимоги українців. У висновку ми 
стверджуємо, що хоча дії, подібні до плану Маршалла, можуть бути корисними, їх навряд чи можна 
розглядати як об'єднуючий суспільний наратив та основу для співробітництва та розвитку. 
Ключові слова:  відносини між ЄС та Україною, План Маршалла, економіка, політика, 
наратив, українські еліти, інтерв'ю. 
Алистер Мискімон, Бен О'Луглин. Программа ЄС, направленная на оздоровление 
Украины? В направлении нового нарратива в отношениях между ЕС и Украиной? В1947 году 
Соединенные Штаты Америки развернули Программу европейского оздоровления с целью 
поддержки восстановления послевоенной Европы. План Маршалла, названный в честь Госсекретаря 
США Джорджа Маршалла, стал одним из наиболее существенных достижений в американской 
внешней политике двадцатого столетия. Идея европейской программы, направленной на 
оздоровление Украины, вызывает как интерес, так и несовместимость мнений украинцев. 
Расширение ЕС в 2004 и 2007 годах продемонстрировало способность Европы осуществлять 
масштабные экономические проекты. Однако с тех пор ЕС испытывает трудности в распространении 
своего влияния и формулировке понятного нарратива относительно своей роли в европейском 
соседстве и на мировой арене. Сможет ли более конструктивная помощь Украине, а также программа 
развития для украинского соседа предоставить новые возможности как для ЕС, так и для Украины? В 
этой статье мы анализируем серию интервью, взятых у представителей элиты из разных регионов 
Украины в 2016-2017 годах с целью получить ответ на поставленный вопрос. Результаты анализа 
показывают, что представители украинской элиты демонстрируют смешанные чувства относительно 
существующих программ помощи Украине со стороны ЕС; многие респонденты возмущены 
условиями, выдвигаемыми ЕС, однако они и не ожидают отсутствия условий как таковых. 
Значительная часть украинской элиты стремятся к тому, чтобы Украина достигла европейских 
стандартов в законодательстве и благополучии граждан, но одновременно отдают предпочтение 
самостоятельному построению независимого государства. И Украина, и Россия воспринимаются 
метонимично – как носители двух систем ценностей и геополитических устремлений; и ни одна из 
этих систем не удовлетворяет требования украинцев. В итоге мы утверждаем, что, хотя действия, 
подобные Плану Маршалла, могут быть полезны, их вряд ли можно рассматривать как 
объединяющий общественный нарратив и основу для сотрудничества и развития. 
Ключевые слова: отношения между ЕС и Украиной, План Маршалла, экономика, политика, 
нарратив, украинские элиты, интервью. 
1. Introduction
Price: The Marshall Plan seemed a spark of light 70 years ago. 
Where do those sparks come from today? There is a yearning 
 for transformative visions!
Kornprobst: If you have a vision you need to see an ophthalmologist1. 
This exchange between US international law professor Monroe Price and German political scientist 
Markus Kornprobst in 2017 takes us to the heart of how we think and talk about political change. 
Can societies be deliberately transformed, particularly societies facing malaise, crisis or conflict? 
And what is the role of communication in transformative processes? Can communication bring 
visions into being or, equally, take visions off the agenda or even off the horizon of what is thought 
possible?  
In our research on public opinion in Ukraine2, the idea of an EU Recovery Programme for 
Ukraine occurs frequently in Ukrainian news media and elicits strong reactions among young 
people in focus groups. Many Ukrainians expected the EU and its member states to do more to help 
when Russia invaded its territory in 2014 and annexed Crimea. Whilst recognizing that the EU 
provides economic and development assistance, some Ukrainians felt this was the moment for a 
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dramatic, visible gesture – whilst others were extremely wary [Chaban and O’Loughlin 2018]. Just 
as the US piled money into Western Europe after WWII to stop the spread of Soviet influence, why 
would the EU not move decisively against Russian influence now? Certainly, times have changed. 
Politically, the notion of “nation-building” has acquired different, often pejorative meanings in 
recent decades. Economically, while markets for capital and lending were stunted after World War 
II, today any Marshall Plan-size investment should in theory be available through financial markets 
[Eichengreen 2001]. And yet, even if financial assistance does go to Ukraine from the EU and 
Ukrainians can borrow money on international markets, this does not offer the same sense of 
collective human agency. The Marshall Plan stands as a template – a simplifying cognitive device 
that gives rapid meaning to events [Kitzinger 2000; Hoskins 2006]. History provides the template; 
events give the EU an opportunity. If not now, when?
The EU already provides a significant amount of assistance to Ukraine through formal 
programmes, such as the €11 billion support package for Ukraine agreed in March 2014. Renewed 
Russian aggression in late 2018 triggered calls within Europe for more assistance [CEPA, 2018]. 
However, the EU has not raised the profile of its assistance and elites within Ukraine display 
ambivalence towards the March 2014 programme. Local elites point to the unwieldy nature of 
financial assistance and academic analysis supports this view [Wolczuk and Žeruolis 2018]. In 
addition, many Ukrainians are unaware of these levels of assistance; or, such assistance is not the 
first thing they think of when they think about the EU. Creating a strategic narrative for this 
assistance is challenging. On the one hand, turning the existing large but low-profile assistance into 
a full-blown ‘plan’ would not require a huge stretch of narrative ingenuity – merely more practical 
organization in how this is communicated. It is a matter of political will, imagination and 
confidence. However, what might appear a compelling strategy to exert greater EU influence faces 
significant challenges. Interviews with leading members of media, business, cultural and political 
elites in Ukraine highlight wide ranging views of the EU and its assistance programmes, both 
positive and negative. Even with the most positive responses to EU activity in Ukraine, few 
interviewees saw EU assistance as the sole answer, and indeed, in the longer term, respondents 
stressed the importance of Ukraine finding a unique path through the political, economic and social 
challenges it faces. From an EU perspective, its reticence to outline a more ambitious basis for 
relations points not only to the dominance of internal crises in the EU’s agenda, but also to 
limitations of EU agency. Nearly all of the 50 Ukrainian elites we interviewed stressed EU internal 
challenges as impediments to the EU playing a more forceful and active international role.
Despite these challenges, the EU and its leading member states need a clearer articulation of 
EU-Ukraine relations, that both provides a basis for a progressive relationship and recognizes the 
current challenges. We argue that the Marshall Plan template suggests that in transformational 
projects it is important to act first according to a general principle, and then build a strategic 
narrative to legitimize that action later. We define strategic narratives as ‘a means for political 
actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present and future of international politics to shape 
the behaviour of domestic and international actors [Miskimmon et al. 2013: 2]. Leaders and 
ordinary citizens are continually fitting new events into prior embedded narratives. Each narrative 
has a setting, a plot involving an obstacle to overcome, characters, tools they use to address the 
obstacle, and an orientation towards desirable or undesirable endings [Burke 1969; Shanahan et al. 
2011].  Here the concept of myth helps unpack the mechanism through which a strategic narrative 
of transformation can appear credible. Myth functions by obscuring the origin of a phenomenon. 
Levi-Strauss writes that myth ‘is language, functioning on an especially high level where meaning 
succeeds practically at “taking off” from the linguistic ground on which it keeps rolling’ [Levi-
Strauss 1955: 430-431]. Details cease to matter. Barthes writes, ‘myth is constituted by the loss of 
the historical quality of things: in it, things lose the memory that they once were made’ [2009: 169].  
What actually happened in the original Marshall Plan becomes masked by the idea of what the 
Marshall Plan was, as a totality. Myth simplifies that past to offer a template for the future. This is 
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how it contributes to strategic narratives that leaders craft to construct a shared meaning of the past, 
present and future of international politics (see also [Bliesemann de Guevara 2016]). 
Consequently, our expectation as we go on to analyse how Ukrainians consider the idea of an 
EU Recovery Programme today is that there will be less focus on what the Marshall Plan actually 
did and, instead, a more open sense of what aid and transformation might look like today. 
Our analysis explores a theory of agent-led transformation in which the meaning of the 
agent’s action becomes clear only after the transformation. We postulate the following model:
1. Leaders monitor the “soup” of policy ideas and visions available to them [see Kingdon, 
1984]
2. An emergency situation demands leaders to choose ideas and articulate a vision
3. Ideational entrepreneurs step forward and seek authorisation to lead a transformative 
programme
4. The programme is enacted in the target country or countries through economic, political 
and cultural policy instruments
5. Some aspects work, some do not, and there are some unforeseen dynamics
6. Post-hoc rationalisation and mythologizing lends the programme coherence; it stands as a 
template for future action
We trace how this operated for the Marshall Plan and then we identify how these aspects are 
considered in contemporary Ukraine.
Certainly, any EU Recovery Programme would risk upsetting Russia, at a time when the EU’s 
open support for NATO already irks the Kremlin. It must not be forgotten that after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, the idea of a Marshall Plan for Russia was an idea in the Washington DC policy 
“soup” through the 1990s [Spechler, 1992; Helprin, 1998]. Many commentators suggested external 
action was needed to stabilize Russia’s economy and institutionalize democracy. Today, however, a 
Recovery Programme for Ukraine would risk reinforcing a ‘new Cold War’ narrative that has 
already been building up in European news media in the past few years [Ojala and Pantti, 2017]. It 
would raise expectations within more pro-European sections of Ukrainian society that would have 
to be met. At the same time, the EU would have to recognize that even pro-EU Ukrainians largely 
reject any complete severing of ties from Russia [Szostek, 2018] and that a Recovery Programme-
boosted Ukraine would still be open to cultural and familial people-to-people ties with Russia. It 
would have to avoid deepening any binary antagonism between the EU and Russia, West and East. 
In short, it would have to be a socio-economic and political plan like the original Marshall Plan but 
not be used to deepen geopolitical divisions and initiate a new Iron Curtain. The EU is largely 
comfortable with hybrid identities and cross-border cultural linkages; such forms of identification 
and modes of being are intrinsic to the European model. But the new plan must not be presented as 
against Russia, no matter how much defensive Russian voices seek to re-narrate it that way. 
In closing the introduction, we highlight three significant implications of our arguments. First, 
for the study of narrative in International Relations, we learn that strategic narratives can help 
organize and signal an actor’s goals before they act, but the real “power” of strategic narratives lies 
in the moment when post-hoc rationalization and mythification of the action meshes with the 
performative expectation that that actor can achieve equal goals in the future. While the US had 
vague goals of limiting Soviet influence and restoring markets for US exports, the Marshall Plan’s 
power became located in the mythical status that, first, the US could achieve major transnational
outcomes and, second, such plans (more Marshall Plans) are possible. 
Second, that whatever benefits an EU Recovery Programme might bring to Ukraine, it might 
bring more benefits to the EU itself. This argument is based on an examination of the original 
Marshall Plan and what it reveals about international transformational projects. These projects are 
rare – EU enlargement in the 1990s and China’s current Belt and Road initiative are perhaps the 
79
most similar ambitious efforts to lead change on a transnational scale. The EU is marked by internal 
crises, not least a direct challenge to liberal values from populist-nationalist leaders which generates 
anxiety about whether liberal societies should exclude the non-liberal [Rae, 2018]. The EU also 
faces a turbulent external order. The EU requires opportunities to evidence its particular form of 
power in the world and to show that its vision of a liberal world order based on democracy, 
managed markets and rule of law is still viable. ‘The gravest risk the European Union faces is to be 
the guardian of a status quo that has ceased to exist,’ writes Krastev [Krastev, 2018, no page]. It 
must show – make visible, through action – that such an order can deliver prosperity and security. 
Our interview data will show the extent to which such a project would be welcome.
Finally, our focus here is the broader strategic canvas – indeed what is at stake here is the very 
notion of a vast canvas for human action and how action works on that canvas. Ideas about Marshall 
Plans offer a chance to reflect on exactly what role visions are supposed to play in international 
relations. We are familiar with imagined communities – our nations or political communities in the 
present and how they emerged from the past. But in a post-ideological age with low trust in leaders, 
experts and institutions to guide change to the collective benefit (at least in the West), we must 
reflect on the value of visions. In our study we evaluate whether Ukrainian elites are closer to Price 
or Kornprobst: Are visions inspirational or an affliction? 
2. What was the Marshall Plan? The creation of a template
Here we examine the actual historical record of how the Marshall Plan unfolded, through the six 
steps of our theoretical model of agent-led transformation in which the meaning of the agent’s 
action becomes clear only after the transformation. This will allow us in the next section to compare 
to contemporary Ukrainian views of a possible EU Recovery Programme for Ukraine.
1. Leaders monitor the “soup” of policy ideas and visions available to them (see [Kingdon, 
1984]).
At the US State Department by 1945 the prevailing ideas about the causes of world wars focused on 
class hatred, poverty and a lack of hope that populations’ circumstances would change (Ellwood, 
2006). It was felt that European societies had never experienced economic democracy – direct 
access to capital and technology. US policymakers observed two narratives competing with the 
Marshall Plan idea: Commintern’s aggressively socialist narrative of development, and a narrative 
of the welfare state that saw security and prosperity emerging through the provision of collective 
goods rather than personal wealth-seeking. US policymakers would come to adapt and bend to the 
welfare state narrative that had wide support in Europe. 
2. An emergency situation demands leaders must choose ideas and articulate avision.
A harsh winter in Europe in 1946-47 created urgency to act. Communist parties in Italy, France and 
Germany appeared to be rising and offered their own rationales and narratives for how Europe 
could be rescued. US policymakers also sought to minimise the chances of another war in Europe 
by addressing public needs and concerns. There was no actual plan: it was a balance of payments 
exercise over the course of a year, motivated by the short-term aim of industrial renewal in Europe. 
It became a four-year initiative as members of the US Congress realized this was a chance to reform 
Western and Central Europe as a bulwark against the USSR and communism. However, there was a 
political aim too. The US recognized an opportunity to convince Europeans that a mix of capitalism 
and democracy did not automatically lead to Nazism, an experience from the 1920s and 1930s that 
scarred European perspectives. The Marshall Plan offered the promise to Europeans of a better life 
through modernization along capitalist-democratic lines. 
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Second, the US was suffering a balance of payment surplus while Europe was largely 
bankrupt – the “dollar gap” [Milward 1989]. Industrial activity in Europe would drive wages and 
thus demand for US goods and currency. 
3. Ideational entrepreneurs step forward and seek authorisation to lead a transformative 
programme.
Marshall and his colleagues wanted to give Europeans not just aid but autonomy. The US would 
deposit reserves for development programmes into European banks. It would be for Europeans to 
decide how that would be spent. Marshall said that the programme was to be ‘a cure rather than 
palliative’ and hence the aim was to enact structural change in how European economies functioned 
[cited in Ellwood, 2006: 19]. There would be no conditionality on aid, and without any stipulation 
about what type of policies recipients must pursue this left the programme open to Soviet countries 
to join. This was a very risky strategy and the USSR soon objected and narrated the Marshall Plan 
as instead an imperial strategy to control Europe. 
4. The programme is enacted in the target country or countries through economic, political 
and cultural policy instruments.
In economic terms, Europeans were encouraged to buy US goods and services. European payments 
would go not to the US but to the Marshall fund that Europeans could draw on. 
As an effort to persuade wary Europeans that capitalism and democracy were the route to a
better life, the Marshall Plan took on the trappings of a marketing campaign. The primary narrative 
was that economic stability and growth were the basis for political independence. Economic 
stability entailed the effort of all individuals, as workers and as consumers. Growth would bring 
ever-expanding prosperity for the ever-expanding mainstream and middle class.
The US Marshall Plan narrative was not uncontested. For this reason, it would be easy to look 
for similarities and lessons for European strategic communications professionals seeking to subvert 
or counter communications from Russia in Eastern Europe today. The US realised that narratives 
from the USSR depicted the Plan unfavourably. The US launched a public and cultural diplomacy 
programme that largely bypassed governments and targeted citizens directly.  
The USSR projected messages about the benefits of communism and framed the Marshall 
Plan as US imperialism or neocolonialism. In 1947 the Cominform decided on a strategy to limit 
‘Marshallization’ in France, Italy, Austria and elsewhere. In France, the Parti Communiste Français 
(PCF) was encouraged to ‘rely on the masses’ because a broad section of workers were unhappy 
with conditions and might be willing to strike, resisting any smooth transition to a new capitalism-
democratic formation [Ross, 1975: 509]. And indeed, working class disenchantment did exist to 
varying degrees across European societies; the Soviet narrative would have credibility to some. 
It is striking that the public and cultural diplomacy efforts were led not by military strategists, 
as many campaigns against Russian information warfare are today, but by civilians in government 
and those recruited from the private sector. Efforts were made to show the future benefits to all 
sections of societies. Leaflets, films, theatre performances as well as photography and news articles 
were mobilized. For instance, in 1948 the US Information Service (USIS) hired Yoichi Okamoto to 
run its Pictorial Section in Vienna, a crucible of propaganda given the Soviet occupation of some of 
the city. Okamoto used artistic photography to document progress and to show individual Austrians 
benefiting from the Plan. As Bischoff and Petschar [2017] argue, Okamoto’s photographs were 
dominated by people smiling – unusually for archive images of that time. Okamoto specifically set 
out to take a present a visual narrative about improved quality of life rather than an abstract 
struggle. It was not a matter of “defeating” the enemy’s vision, but of generating support for the US 
vision. Civil agents were not secondary to military agents. 
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5. Some aspects work, some do not, and there are some unforeseen dynamics
The Marshall Plan succeeded in reducing trade between European states and their old empires and 
instead boosting trade within Europe – a key structural transformation. Relations between France 
and Germany improved. Yet there was resistance too: each country had political factions opposed to 
the Plan in some way and US policymakers had to give way to governments introducing welfare 
programmes. 
There may have been one Marshall Plan, but it meant many things to many countries inside 
and outside Europe, depending on each country’s self-image and national narrative. This is the case 
for all phenomena in international relations. France’s post-WWII narrative was that the French 
nation recovered through its own hard work, not a Marshall Plan. 
Austria became a specific focus point for contestation between the Marshall Plan narrative and 
Soviet communications. Many Austrians feared becoming another Germany and thus open to 
persuasion about how to achieve some kind of political stability. When the Marshall Plan began, 
Austria was particularly under Soviet-occupation. However, motivated by the aim of limiting Soviet 
influence in the country, the Marshall Plan avoided placing conditions on participation and provided 
funding to all sections of Austria anyway.  
6. Post-hoc rationalisation and mythologizing lends the programme coherence; it stands as 
a template for future action
A US action to restore European economies after World War II became possible because of 
bipartisan support motivated by fear of totalitarianism, extremism and the rise of the USSR – US 
Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson reversed his backing of détente in 1946. Hence we might 
question the degree to which a transformational project needs a dangerous external force it must 
unify against. 
The Marshall Plan has gained mythical status as the most successful US foreign policy ever. 
For Ellwood [2006] the Marshall Plan was a focal point that allowed the US develop grand strategy 
for the first time. This in turn allowed US policymakers to reflect on the characterization of their 
nation and their national narrative. The personal became tied to a wider mission. One Marshall plan 
policymaker later reflected: ‘We had a goal; we had fire in our bellies; we worked like hell; we had 
rough, disciplined thinking; and we could program, strive for, and see results’ [cited in Ellwood 
2012: 344].
As a geopolitical exercise the Marshall Plan also brought the notion of European integration to 
public consciousness, beyond policymakers and intellectuals. 
In summary, based on this history, what might we expect an EU Recovery Programme for 
Ukraine to encounter? First, that reception and effects will vary by region. Second, that counter-
narratives will emerge and the EU would have to recognize and even perhaps accommodate local 
preferences. Given the imbalance of power between the EU and Ukraine, a Plan would need to 
avoid the appearance of pacification. Third, a Plan would be easier if presented in opposition to a 
threatening other, but loyalties in Ukraine are not binary and the EU would have to manage 
relations with Russia sensitively. Fourth, that it would provide a sense of purpose and confidence 
for both Ukrainians and the EU. 
The EU has provided assistance to Ukraine since 1991. From 1992-2015 the EU offered 
around €12.1 billion in assistance. The European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) offered 
the largest assistance of €2.3 billion [Wolczuk and Zeruolis, 2018]. When Russia invaded Ukrainian 
territory in 2014 the EU launched a Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) programme – a crisis 
response instrument intended to secure the EU neighbourhood. The EU obtains the capital on 
international markets and loans it to Ukraine on the same conditions under which the EU borrowed 
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the capital. As reported in the Kyiv Post, this positions the EU as ‘lender’ and Ukraine as ‘borrower’ 
[Petrov 2018]. Following Russian aggression against the Ukrainian navy in the Azov Sea in 
November 2018 the EU released the first tranche of a new MFA of €500 million in assistance 
[European Commission, 2018]. This made Ukraine recipient of the largest amount of EU funding 
by any non-EU country, but on what the EU concedes are similar conditions to IMF assistance 
[ibid]. 
Member states have offered around €1.4 billion in direct grants since 1992 and also offer 
assistance in a number of forms. For instance, the British Council and Goethe Institute use cultural 
relations activities to help Ukrainians develop their civil society. Funded by their respective foreign 
ministries, these organisations use arts and language programmes to foster social entrepreneurship 
and dialogue across Ukraine’s regions. The EU also supports technical assistance projects at a local 
level. Both these cultural and technical instruments operate according to a mix of cascade, network 
and diffusion models of social change to shift norms and practices. However, they face limits 
whereby the funding of short- and medium- term projects does not necessarily help Ukraine build 
stronger institutions [British Council and Goethe-Institut 2018; Wolczuk and Zeruolis 2018]. There 
is also a lack of an overarching concept and the EU, facing the opportunity to be the primary 
conduit to channel international assistance to Ukraine, has been slow to offer such conceptual or 
practical coordination [Rabinovych 2018]. There are, in short, enough instruments to allow for a 
single ‘plan’ but this is not realized. 
3. Method
As part of an EU-funded project on EU crisis diplomacy in Ukraine, throughout 2016-2017 fifty 
elites were interviewed across Ukraine working in the media, business, the cultural sphere, civil 
society and politics. Our aim was to understand how the EU is perceived in Ukraine, and to identify 
the narratives used by elites to explain not only the challenges Ukraine faces, but also how elites 
narrate their understanding of the EU and Ukraine-EU relations. Interviews were semi-structured 
with elites in the capital Kyiv, centre and east of Ukraine. Interviews were conducted in Ukrainian 
or Russian depending on the interviewee’s preference, and recorded, transcribed, and translated. 
Interviewees gave consent to publication on condition of anonymity; the anonymity procedure also 
follows Human Ethics Committees’ prescriptions. The questionnaire ranged across themes of the 
EU’s perceived role in the world vis-à-vis other major powers, perceptions of the EU’s potential 
role in resolving the Ukraine-Russia conflict, and the role of media in shaping the images of the EU 
and EU-Ukraine relations (this last theme was explored in-depth in the interviews with media 
professionals).  
Central to these discussions was what role the EU should have in Ukraine’s economic and 
political development. We found a wide range of views of how Ukraine should best develop and a 
largely ambivalent view of the role of the EU in this process. Economic aid was a universal topic 
for discussion, but often couched in less than positive terms, despite its centrality to EU-Ukraine 
relations. Economic assistance was little understood and importantly, there was no clear 
overarching narrative of its medium to long-term perspective. 
Four major narratives emerged from the wide-ranging interviews we conducted. First, that the 
EU’s work and economic assistance in Ukraine is little understood, even among elites, who 
frequently point to a lack of awareness of the EU’s role. Ukrainian elites narrate the international 
system as state-centric, rather than defined by constitutive institutions. Second, Ukrainian elites 
focused almost universally on the need to domestic reform, without which, an assistance was seen 
as papering over the cracks. Third, elites were very aware of the EU’s internal challenges and 
directly pointed to that as limiting the EU’s engagement in Ukraine. Finally, there was no clear 
future oriented narrative of EU-Ukraine relations and development goals for Ukraine. We highlight 
this below in the analysis of our findings. We analyse the findings through the lens of our six-stage 
model of transformative projects. 
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4. Results: Analysis of Ukraine elite interviews
1. Leaders monitor the “soup” of policy ideas and visions available to them (see [Kingdon, 
1984])
In our analysis of the interview data, we looked for what ideas Ukrainian elites refer to, and in 
particular, whether after years of EU assistance they are dissatisfied with existing aid programmes 
or want something new. National reforms set the context for much of the respondents’ statements. 
The ebb and flow of reforms, driven by perceived sporadic engagement with the EU and 
inconsistent domestic application of policies, is a major theme in our discussions with interviewees. 
The lack of full realisation of reforms provides a source of frustration for interviewees and provides 
challenges for a coherent reform process to emerge. For instance, a civil society actor speaking in 
December 2016 argued the following:
All the history of Ukrainian reforms is the inconsistent, incomplete, half-reforms. This means, 
classical political science says that such reforms, they are worse than the absence of any 
reforms because stopping the reforms at some point, it is usually advantageous to certain 
clans, certain forces, certain mobbing groups that peruse this incompleteness, these holes, 
which are consequently formed. And here we have the same experience, for twenty-five years 
we have been having these pseudo reforms.
The incompleteness of the national reform efforts is foregrounded in interviewee responses. 
However, several interviewees refer to the EU in aspirational terms. One political elite, when 
interviewed in January 2017 suggests, 
The EU as an institution for me is this benchmark, of what we have to build in Ukraine. I am 
not talking about immediate membership in the EU because it is impossible. If we take the 
experience of Poland, applying in 1994 until 1 January 2004, when Poland joined the EU, it 
took at least 10 years. But the EU for me is that strategy of how not only the EU has to be 
developing, but those principles that are inherent in the functioning of this institution that we 
have to build in Ukraine.
Here we see the policy ‘soup’ of ideas these elite consider are based on templates: a template of 
positive reform with the EU and its principles as a benchmark, versus incomplete and therefore 
harmful reform. 
Next, we treat two stages together: 
2. An emergency situation demands leaders to choose ideas and articulate a vision
3. Ideational entrepreneurs step forward and seek authorisation to lead a transformative 
programme
In the main, most interviewees considered that EU member states and their leaders, rather than the 
EU as a unitary actor, were the major players in shaping policy discussions between the EU and 
Ukraine. For example, a civil society actor interviewed in February 2016 was asked if they though 
the EU is a leader in international politics. They replied:
Yes and no. Because, you know, as they say, in the EU there is a matter of perception of the 
EU. That is, you know, the old joke when I need to talk to the EU, the Americans say "who I 
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need to call?" right. That is, on the one hand it claims to be a leader, yes, and there competing, 
for example, with the same United States or China in the world. Nevertheless, this leadership 
can often be treated with doubt because there is on the one hand the leadership of three major, 
core countries, i.e. Germany, France and the UK. And the leadership of the European Union 
as a union, yes. That is always, as they say ... These, as they say, certain problems, nuances 
related to this. But clearly, still I would say that the EU is a leader in the world.
Other interviewees were more explicit in pointing to what they thought were the limitations of 
the EU. Speaking in December 2016 a civil society actor responded to the same question stating:
Good question. Well, obviously [the EU] is not a leader to the extent that it could have been, 
to the extent, say, the United States certainly are, that take this more proactive position, and 
paradoxically that is Russia. It is not a leader, it is a spoiler, but a very effective spoiler. The 
European Union in this respect is much weaker and more passive, but it is the leader, well at 
least in the sense that it sets some, well, given that it is economic power, that is, it sets some 
parameters.
Respondents refer to a small number of EU member states – Germany, the UK, Poland, 
Lithuania, Sweden, and to a lesser extent France – as being the main supporters of Ukraine in the 
EU. Overall, however, interviewees highlight both internal and external actors being engaged, 
largely proactively, in reform processes. Business elites point to the under-exploited role of SMEs 
in driving economic reform and point to the impediments to supporting this in current EU funding 
mechanisms [see also Wolczuk and Zeruolis 2018]. Interviewees do not look to political leaders. 
Rather, each group of interviewees – business, media, civil society, culture and politics – point to 
how their own sectors could have greater influence in driving reform. This indicates overall support 
for gradualism through networks in specific sectors and engaging with EU member states. It does 
not indicate support for a radical transformation plan.
4. The programme is enacted in the target country or countries through economic, political 
and cultural policy instruments
We have learnt a lot about economic and political development since 1947, and Ukraine has its own 
experiences of assistance since gaining independence. We know that transformations require 
hierarchy and transactions between different layers of administration both internally and externally. 
Experts from international organisations, from local government, and from NGOs will compete to 
shape policy implementation and may not have an interest in opening up public involvement in 
policy (Odugbemi and Lee, 2011).  However, public acceptance of any transformation matters for 
long-term institutionalization. Peripheral regions within a society may have the capacity to resist or 
elect local leaders who seek to roll back the transformative policy; reversal is possible. 
Some of the interviewees pinpoint concrete ways in which the EU’s assistance is helping 
Ukraine. Cultural and educational links were regularly raised in interviews as showing potential for 
good. Some respondents focus on the challenges this has brought. Business and political elites 
focused on the pros and cons of EU assistance from the perspective of wealth generation and 
political influence. For instance, one interviewee from the business sector when interviewed in 
March 2017 stated:
I think that, generally speaking, everyone should pursue his interest in the EU makes it much 
better [for business] than Ukraine. I personally have not analyzed the free trade agreement 
between Ukraine and the EU. I listened to people who told me that unfortunately the interests 
of Ukraine … are not very well represented and protected. That, say so – there is no free 
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cheese. And unfortunately the Ukrainian state is too weak to defend its interests. And I think 
everything else is derived from this. 
The same interviewee went on to describe the EU as ‘conservative, hypocritical, inefficient’. 
Interviewees view economic instruments both positively and negatively. For example, a political 
actor interviewed in December 2016 responded asked whether the EU’s image had improved as a 
result of committing resources to Ukraine replied in the following way:
Well, let’s probably put it this way. All this allocated money has to be returned by us. So, I 
see this as an exclusively negative thing. The allocation of funds is done on credit. So, 
naturally, I am against it. From my point of view, I think it to be wrong. In my understanding, 
now the EU is enjoying the hard situation in Ukraine and places its spheres of influence by, 
let's say, allocating funds to us. First, they have to be returned... Secondly, let’s say, the IMF’s 
participation... of course, it’s not exactly the EU, but nevertheless they’re sending the same 
message: to change the social situation, to increase tariffs. I also associate this with the work 
of the EU in this direction. That is, we are now setting ourselves the task of bringing our 
fundamental prices, tariffs and everything to the level in the EU, and, as a result, [our] 
perception of the EU is not positive in this respect….
Another interviewee stressed the conditional nature of the funding from the EU. In an 
interview with a political elite in October 2016 they argued that financial aid had not substantially 
changed the perception of the EU in Ukraine: 
Taking into account the fact that... The implementation of a support package of 11 billion 
euro... and what was it used for? For the military conflict to a greater extent. But not everyone 
understands that it needs to be returned. Of course, there is [some help] for the city. There are
programmes. We’re working with the World Bank; they’re financing, improving, roughly 
speaking, network utilities, all assets, for example, some pumps... Extra money is being 
allocated for the housing stock. There’s a programme... which is also the World Bank’s... a 
plant recycling household waste is being planned to be built. The first stage has already... It’s 
in the Dergachevsky training ground. In this respect, yes. But this is taken on credit in any 
case. That is, we took, we’re building. Yes, it’s good. But we will have to return it. 
This respondent felt any aid must be repaid, while Ukraine loses from the cost of reforming 
practices to meet EU benchmarks. Another political elite, speaking in January 2017, refers rather 
cynically to different incentives within Ukraine for working with the EU:
Smart people think, they understand that the EU is some values, processes, values, people.  
And for the rest of the public it is like an ATM, as a source of income, etcetera. Maybe in this 
way it has changed more. Expectations that here they have to help us somehow.
This respondent pointed to attitudes in Ukraine that the state did not have to reform as aid would 
come anyway. These responses show that whether aid is conditional or ‘like an ATM’ there is no 
sense that EU aid has had positive effects. 
5. Some aspects work, some do not, and there are some unforeseen dynamics
Interviewees based much of their discussions on the future impact of intra-EU problems for 
Ukraine. A civil society actor interviewed in February 2017 was asked their view of the impact of 
the Euro crisis, Brexit and the migration crisis on the EU. They said:
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Well, it’s a bit devalued. And in the world and in Ukraine, I think. But when it comes to the 
world, selectively. For Brexit is perceived by many in the United States, including Trump 
primarily, positive. Some here perceive Brexit, including me, positively too. Although this 
position is quite unusual. It even shocked our local commentators, so to say, and the 
politicians … That is, everyone thought that Europe should grow like a snow ball, adding on 
and adding on its surroundings on itself. Suddenly it began to disintegrate. 
This narration of the unravelling of the EU came up several times across the interviews. The 
unraveling was understood to be limiting the EU’s agency to play a defining role in Ukraine. This is 
particularly significant for Ukraine, given the events of Maidan. There has been a double shift in 
narrative since 2014 in Ukraine – moving from a narrative of Ukraine’s EU destiny, to one of 
Ukraine’s need for domestic reform as the priority and a shift towards a narrative of the EU focused 
on the centrifugal pressures on European integration, rather than its integrative strengths. This shift 
complicates the reception of any EU narrative in Ukraine, highlighted in our interview data.
6. Post-hoc rationalisation and mythologizing lends the programme coherence; it stands as 
a template for future action
It was generally unclear across the interviews what narratives or myths elites in Ukraine had for 
future relations, which could act as a template for action. There was no sense of a tangible future 
but nor a template in the past to draw upon. In an interview on 29th June 2016, one media elite 
suggested:
The relationship of Ukraine and the European Union is, unfortunately, changing from a 
romantic period to a period of a kind of confrontation at the moment. At least on the regional 
level, it’s 100%, I mean on the level of separate states. Just today they have written that the 
Netherlands are very likely to block the signing of the Association Agreement. Our 
relationship with Poland, our closest neighbor, on the public level is, unfortunately, 
deteriorating a lot, and this is a result, in many ways, of the information policy both of Russia 
and of our country, a disastrous one, unfortunately. That’s why we, and especially after what 
has happened to Britain [Brexit], unfortunately, are becoming a very unpleasant and 
problematic topic which they should try to avoid, to “sweep under the rug” at best or even to 
get rid of totally. The Ukrainian topic is untimely.
This respondent suggests that the time for optimism where relations were close is changing and that 
given the priority of other challenges, Ukraine is now not a priority. Historical relationships which 
proved useful in the past are waning. There is no sense that a coherent solution is possible - the 
window of opportunity has passed and Ukraine has been left unloved.
However, one member of the cultural elite in Ukraine interviewed in December 2016 
suggested that Ukraine faced an historical choice:
From my point of view, for Ukraine to join the EU, it is necessary to break its relations with 
the Soviet past at all levels. The nearest reminder of the Soviet past is Russia. So now a 
strategic process of breaking relations is taking place. But since we did not use to have a 
feeling that Russia was an enemy, it has happened, and this process is under-way. But our 
innate skepticism, it helps many people to keep some balance of awareness that what may 
happen is like “out of the frying pan into the fire”. That is, visible softness is a myth. As Ostap 
Bender said: “Talks about Europe are myths of the afterlife.”
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This interviewee suggests that myth is central to any future-oriented trajectory which Ukraine may 
have. Indeed, the idea of joining the EU has come to possess the qualities of myth – where the 
notion originated no longer matters, and how much of a guide for action is could be is wholly 
uncertain. With this trajectory comes challenges, with no clear resolution. From this perspective, 
EU membership, and hence the underlying logic of relations with the EU, is not clear. The EU has 
no clear strategic narrative to help address this, hampered by not having a clear membership 
perspective for Ukraine, and indeed for the wider European Neighbourhood Policy [Miskimmon, 
2018].
A civil society actor, speaking in December 2016 made this point when they said:
… it is probably easier to describe it as different perspectives of expectations. Because the EU 
sees Ukraine and in general all the neighbours. This, by the way, this so-called European 
Neighbourhood Policy, or the European neighborhood, this reflects it very well. The very 
name of this policy is ambivalent, because it is not clear what is at stake - European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Is this the Policy of European Neighbourhood or the European Policy 
of Neighbourhood? It can be interpreted both ways. I also assume that this name was coined 
not without such an intent. 
This civil society tries to see how Ukraine is viewed from the perspective of the EU, continuing:
In any case, this policy reflects the attitude of the EU to its neighbors primarily as soft and 
potentially hard threat. That is, their attitude towards neighbours is aimed primarily to 
minimizing the external threats. So that there was no threat of uncontrolled migration, 
penetration of crime, human trafficking, etc., drugs, pollution, all these infectious diseases. 
That is, they see us primarily as a threat. They are of course trying to somehow keep these 
neighboring countries afloat, so they do not become failed states, so to minimize these threats. 
Well, such a pragmatic policy. 
This individual concluded by considering whether Ukraine is being spurned by the EU by accident 
or simply by neglect of attention: 
In any case it is not about integration, it is not their agenda. That is, this attitude is about the 
same as America’s to Mexico. It is necessary that Mexico was more or less sustainable and 
viable. Ukraine, on the other hand, has very different expectations, Ukraine still always 
emphasizes the desire to integrate, that is to learn, integrate the structures, which means to 
take all these values, to meet the Copenhagen criteria. That is a completely different attitude 
and, of course, as one partner wants the marriage, the other just wants neighbour’s 
cohabitation. It is difficult to reconcile these expectations, there is always some friction. 
This lack of clarity is an opening for manipulation of how the EU is presented in Ukraine, but 
also serves as a potential opportunity for greater clarity and public debate. A Ukrainian media elite, 
interviewed on 28 July 2016 argued the following:
Because in this country the topic of the EU is often used as an attempt to manipulate public 
opinion and that’s bad. In all that “slag”, as I call it, even topics of high quality get lost. 
Professional approach is just profaned. It’s a problem, but it’s a general problem, but it’s also 
evident in the EU case. There are also a great number of myths which need to be dispelled or 
confirmed because the EU is something frightening to them. Russia is also playing on those 
myths and stereotypes, with all those horror stories. And this general ignorance of the 
audience, of course… It’s very simple to play on that ignorance. But it’s a very long process. 
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It must be a separate trend on forming an adequate attitude. It should be dealt with 
professionally, and not only mass media should take part in it. It doesn’t concern the EU 
exclusively; it’s just can be seen vividly in the case of the EU.
Media elites pointed to the need for greater support for a free press in Ukraine to have a firm 
basis for discussion of Ukraine’s future development. For this respondent, the EU must help 
Ukraine build a more robust public sphere both as an intrinsic good and as a mechanism to reduce 
the potential influence of Russian myths. 
In another response, Ukraine’s relations with the EU and Russia are set within a challenging 
binary of potential rebirth and psychoanalysis – looking back to Ukraine’s historical ties affecting 
which paths lie before Ukraine. A civil society actor speaking in December 2016 argued:
Well, from what I see – of course they are opposed. I see this on the level of the elites, and the 
so-called elites, and the society. To varying degrees, but I think that everyone understands 
what they are, so to speak, metonymies of two different projects, the EU and Russia. 
Embodiments of different value systems, totally different development paths. So I think that 
when we say these two words, immediately there is a whole chain of associations that entails 
almost all of the geopolitics. So, the other thing that we have, well, you see, there is a huge 
part of society that has a kind of schizophrenia because they came out of this Orthodox 
Eastern Slavic world, this imaginary community or imagined community, right. But at the 
same time their logic suggests them that Russia is still hostile, Russia is dangerous, Russia is 
threatening, Russia is the dead end of development, but at the same time this belonging 
remains.
The EU and Russia stand as metonyms for wider value systems and geopolitical futures – but 
both are problematic. This civil society actor continued: 
This umbilical cord [with Russia], it is still uncut, it creates a huge conflict, I just see it that 
way, again you can see that from sociology [that] shows that the society it is shifting, 
gradually drifting to the West, even if for different reasons there is not much enthusiasm about 
the EU. I can understand that too, the EU itself is often alienating Ukrainians. Moreover, there 
is no more enthusiasm about Russia, about this Eastern Slavic union, it is already too, thank 
God, gone or disappearing. 
This reinforces a narrative where there is no clear path or clarity on the role that the EU will have in 
Ukraine’s future development. Nation-building defines many of the responses concerning the future 
of EU-Ukraine relations. A member of the business elite interviewed in January 2017 argues,
I think that if in ten years we got the status of a candidate in the EU, an official one, a 
confirmed one with calm and clear prospects, it would be the best outcome for Ukraine. 
Because the country would already get some, you know, firm understanding that in the 
future… I understand that it is too early for us to be a member, it is so early, we still have to 
do so much work in order to reach the level of those states. Talking about the level, I mean the 
level of legislation first of all, military power, let’s say the capacity to defend ourselves. Those 
values, we are talking about, European values, they must be really absorbed by us, not simply 
declared, bur absorbed: we do not have corruption or we understand to some degree and 
mentally, and personally we do not support corruption. We are building a sovereign state…
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Ukraine lacks the qualities of a coherent sovereign state, in this account. Free of any myths of 
rescue, support or shared destiny offered by the EU or Russia, Ukraine should be left to itself as it 
passes through these stages. 
5. Conclusions
The idea of an EU Recovery Programme for Ukraine, based on a template of the Marshall Plan, 
emerged within a three-year research project analyzing Ukrainian perceptions of the EU. As a thought 
experiment, and based on lessons learnt from the original Marshall Plan, we can say that such a vision 
offers the EU an opportunity to challenge the sense of retrenchment and fatalism in the face of 
challenges to a liberal order of market democracies. It would also offer Ukraine a sense of movement in 
the context of the stalemate of its war with Russia and slow pace of development. In this article we took 
the notion of an EU Recovery Programme for Ukraine identified in our ongoing research, developed it 
into a six-stage model of transformational political projects, and then explored how Ukrainian elites 
considered those stages. These interviewees talked about the nature and results of current EU aid 
practices. Some criticized aid as conditional, others as containing an unevenness that could cause 
unintended damage, and others as ‘like an ATM’ that meant Ukrainians might not confront the 
substantive challenges they face. There is no support for anything project fitting the Marshall Plan 
template. Interviewees offered no simple acceptance of how any transformation would work in any of 
the six stages. The emerging narrative is instead: leave us to reform ourselves and gradually enhance 
relations through cultural, business and civil society networks. 
Critically, interviewees drew attention to the mythical and metonymic qualities of transformative 
visions; mythical because any original transformation has been long forgotten and is no basis for current 
discussion, and metonymic because the EU and Russia stand for wider value systems and historical 
trajectories that Ukrainians might choose between. Each of those futures is uncertain. That uncertainty is 
reinforced by doubt about the capacity and motives of both the EU and Russia as actors. EU member 
states rather than the EU itself are viewed as more credible actors. The EU is equated with financial and 
migration crises, for some. Indeed, some respondents supported Brexit in part because it suggested it is 
possible for a country to be European but not of the EU. 
What are the implications for the EU’s narrative towards Ukraine? Our analysis indicates that 
national sovereignty is key to Ukrainian elites’ narratives of the past, present and future of their 
country. The Marshall Plan boosted states who welcomed managed markets and capitalism but did 
not involve overt transformation of political structures. Through post-1990 enlargement policies the 
EU has, in contrast, always conceived of a linkage between conditional aid and political reform 
both in domestic institutions and joining EU institutions. There is no indication Ukrainian elites 
would welcome such a process; they prefer national consolidation.   
Perhaps the idea of another Marshall Plan points to an intrinsically regressive mode of thinking. 
Templates bring problems as well as inspiration. Kitzinger writes, ‘Far from opening up historical 
reflection they reify a kind of historical determinism which can filter out dissenting accounts, 
camouflage conflicting facts and promote one type of narrative’ [Kitzinger, 2000: 76]. Another
Hiroshima, another Great Depression, another EU enlargement – these simplifying cognitive devices 
can limit the range of options considered and prevent policymakers from understanding what is unique 
about the present situation. Our interviewees were alert to the dangers of myths and this challenges 
those in Ukraine and the EU to imagine alternative models of building a shared future.  
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NOTES
1. Milton Wolf Seminar, Diplomatische Akademie Wien, Vienna, 25-27 April 2017. See http://www.aaf-
online.org/index.php/news-details/items/milton-wolf-seminar-2017.html
2. Data presented is from a three-year research project called “Crisis, Conflict and Critical Diplomacy: EU 
Perceptions in Ukraine and Israel/Palestine” (C3EU), supported by the Jean Monnet Programme of the 
Erasmus+ (see Introduction by Chaban and Zhabotynska (2018) to this Special Issue.
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